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I. INTRODUCTION
The Joint Committee on Taxation of the U.S. Congress
issued a three-volume study in April 2001 entitled Study of
the Overall State of the Federal Tax System and Recom-
mendations for Simplification (Joint Committee Study).1
Among the more than 100 recommendations of the Joint
Committee Study, ten relate to international taxation. Of
these, only one can be regarded as achieving significant
simplification – the proposal to reduce the number of anti-
deferral regimes from six to two.2 The other recommenda-
tions were limited to relatively minor changes of detail in
various international provisions.3 Even these small steps
toward simplifying the notoriously complex U.S. interna-
tional tax rules, however, were not included in the Eco-
nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,
signed into law on 7 June 2001.
This article suggests some more fundamental ways to sim-
plify the U.S. international tax rules. In order to do so, one
needs a coherent picture of what U.S. international taxa-
tion is trying to achieve. The article therefore first outlines
the two fundamental principles or goals of U.S. interna-
tional taxation: the single tax principle and the benefits
principle. The article then describes six proposals to sim-
plify U.S. international taxation in accordance with the
two principles described earlier. The final part concludes.
II. THE TWO PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
In previous works, this author described two fundamental
principles underlying the U.S. international tax regime
(and, in his view, the international tax regime in general):
the single tax principle and the benefits principle.4 The sin-
gle tax principle states that income from cross-border
transactions should be subject to a single imposition of
income tax – not more and not less. The benefits principle
states that the rate of the single level of tax imposed on
income from cross-border transactions should depend on
whether the income is active (from a source under the tax-
payer’s control) or passive (from a source not under the
taxpayer’s control). Active income should be subject to
tax primarily at source, while passive income should be
subject to tax primarily on a residence basis.5
This author has argued elsewhere that the fundamental
structure of U.S. international taxation can be understood
as reflecting these two principles.6 Specifically, the United
States (like other countries that tax residents on a world-
wide basis) divides the world into “U.S. persons” and
“non-U.S. persons”. U.S. persons are taxed on worldwide
income, while non-U.S. persons are taxed only on U.S.-
source income. In each case, the applicable tax rules
depend on the active/passive income dichotomy. In the
case of non-U.S. persons, passive U.S.-source income is
taxed by imposing a gross-based withholding tax, while
active U.S.-source income is taxed on a net basis. In the
case of U.S. persons, passive income is taxed currently,
while active income benefits from deferral or (because of
the foreign tax credit) exemption. The resulting structure
looks as follows:
World
U.S. persons Non-U.S. persons
(taxed on all income) (taxed on U.S.-source 
income only)
Passive Active Passive Active
income income income income
(current tax) (deferral/exemption) (gross tax) (net tax)
high tax low tax low tax high tax
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1. Joint Committee on Taxation, Study of the Overall State of the Federal Tax
System and Recommendations for Simplification, Pursuant to Section
8022(3)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (April 2001).
2. A similar proposal was twice enacted by Congress in bills that were vetoed
by the President in 1992.
3. These recommendations were: increasing the Subpart F de minimis
amount; enacting a look-through rule for 10/50 companies; allowing deemed
paid credits for controlled foreign corporations held through foreign partner-
ships; conforming the possessions credits; modifying the uniform capitalization
rules for international transactions; eliminating the secondary withholding tax;
eliminating the U.S.-source tax on certain capital gains; and updating the U.S.
Model Income Tax Convention. All of these are useful, but minor, steps toward
simplification. 
4. See generally Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “The Structure of International Taxa-
tion: A Proposal for Simplification”, 74 Texas Law Review 1301 (1995); and
Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “International Taxation of Electronic Commerce”, 52
Tax Law Review 507 (1997).
5. For a normative justification of these principles, see id., “International
Taxation of Electronic Commerce”.
6. See Avi-Yonah, “The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for
Simplification”, supra note 4.
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The designations “high tax” and “low tax” reflect the
actual operation of the rules. Non-U.S. persons are subject
to low taxation on passive income because of the myriad
exemptions and reductions applicable to passive income,
ranging from treaty-based reductions to source rules (e.g.
capital gains) to specific exemptions (e.g. the portfolio
interest exemption). Non-U.S. persons are subject to con-
siderably higher taxation on active income, i.e. income
effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business. U.S.
persons are subject to high taxation on passive income
because it is taxed currently and foreign tax credits are
usually not available because of the basket system. U.S.
persons are subject to low taxation on active income
because of the availability of deferral and the ability to
cross-credit within the general basket.7
In theory, this regime presents a coherent whole that
implements the single tax and benefits principles. Active
income is taxed primarily when earned by non-U.S. per-
sons (at source), and this is supposed to be reflected in low
or no taxation in their country of residence. Passive
income is taxed primarily when earned by U.S. persons
(on a residence basis), and this is supposed to be reflected
in low taxation on a source basis. In practice, there is rea-
son to doubt whether single taxation of either active or
passive income is achieved. Source-based taxation of
active income can be avoided, for example, by falling
under the permanent establishment threshold, which may
be easier to do with the advent of electronic commerce. In
other jurisdictions, source-based taxation can also be
avoided by taking advantage of the myriad preferential
regimes (such as tax holidays) for active income. Resi-
dence-based taxation of passive income depends on ade-
quate information exchange, which is lacking in many
jurisdictions. Because of these problems, a significant pro-
portion of cross-border income may in fact escape taxation
altogether.8 These are not particularly American problems,
however, and the rest of this article ignores them as they
defy unilateral solutions.
III. SIX STEPS TOWARD SIMPLIFICATION
A. Simplify the source rules
The source rules (I.R.C. § 861 et seq.9) are complex in
themselves. In addition, the fact that each category of
income has its own source rule causes significant transac-
tional complexity as taxpayers try to manipulate the
source of income so that the resulting substantive tax rule
will be to their advantage. Moreover, the differentiation
between the various categories is very difficult and gives
rise to much litigation and elaborate regulatory exercises.10
In order to simplify the source rules, one needs to under-
stand how they relate to the benefits principle. In general,
the source rules can be divided into formal ones (where the
source is under the taxpayer’s control) and substantive
ones (where it is not). Formal rules include the rules for
dividends and interest (residence of the payer, since cor-
porate residence is under the taxpayer’s control), capital
gains (residence of the seller), and purchased inventory
(the title passage rule). Substantive rules include the rule
for royalties (place of use), services (place of perform-
ance), manufactured inventory (50% sourced to place of
production and 50% to place of sale), and real estate (loca-
tion of property).
In general, this classification corresponds to the active/
passive dichotomy: active income is sourced under a sub-
stantive rule, while passive income is sourced under a for-
mal one. This makes sense because the United States,
under the benefits principle, has a stronger interest in tax-
ing active income than passive income at source and,
therefore, cares less about permitting taxpayers to avoid
source-based taxation of passive income (by manipulating
the formal source rule) than active income. The two
exceptions are royalties, which are active income in many
cases, and sales of purchased inventory, where the rule
was intended to be substantive (when title passage meant
something, such as passing the risk of loss), but became
formal due to non-tax legal developments (the Uniform
Commercial Code).
Ideally, however, one would like to have only two source
rules: one for passive income and the other for active
income. This would prevent the endless arguments about
income classification from having much bite. What rules
are appropriate? In the case of passive income, the United
States has only a residual interest in taxing the income if
residence-based taxation is lacking (e.g. because there is
no treaty and hence no information exchange). Thus, it
seems that a sensible rule would be to classify as U.S.
source any passive income that is deductible from U.S.
active income – i.e. interest and royalties that are
deductible by taxpayers (U.S. or non-U.S.) against their
U.S.-source income. Other forms of passive income that
are not deductible (dividends and capital gains) would not
be U.S. source because the United States will already have
exacted one level of tax from the underlying corporate
income, and that should suffice.
In the case of active income, the key is to have a single
source rule that avoids the need to distinguish between
royalties, services and sales. Given that the underlying
goal is to tax U.S.-source active business income, the
appropriate source rule would be to treat as U.S. source
any active income that is effectively connected with a U.S.
trade or business, regardless of its character. This, of
course, begs the question of what is “effectively con-
nected”, but this problem is resolved if the formulary
apportionment proposal advocated below (see III.C.) is
adopted.
The above analysis relates to source rules for inbound
transactions. The source rules, however, are also important
for outbound transactions because of the foreign tax credit
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7. See id. for much more detail on this structure and its normative justifica-
tion.
8. See Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fis-
cal Crisis of the Welfare State”, 113 Harvard Law Review 1573 (2000).
9. All references to the U.S. Internal Revenue Code are to the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1986, as amended (I.R.C.).
10. For litigation, see e.g. Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369 (1949)
(royalties or capital gains); Karrer v. United States, 152 F.Supp. 66 (1957) (roy-
alties or services); and Boulez v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 584 (1984) (royalties or
services). For regulations, see e.g. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-18 (the software regula-
tions).
limitation. But there is no reason why the source rule for
this purpose should be the same as the inbound source
rules. Rather, it seems that, given the purpose of the for-
eign tax credit (to prevent double taxation), the sensible
source rule for outbound transactions would be to treat as
foreign source whatever the relevant foreign country treats
as domestic source for purposes of applying its foreign
tax. This poses some risk of excessive grabbing of income
by the foreign jurisdiction to elevate the foreign tax credit
limit, but as long as the tax is not a soak-up tax, the risk
seems a tolerable one.
B. Abolish withholding taxation
The United States achieves very little in terms of revenue
by imposing a 30% withholding tax on gross payments to
foreigners. The reason for this is the myriad exemptions
and reductions that restrict the application of this tax. Cap-
ital gains are not taxed because of the source rule. Interest
is generally not taxed because of the portfolio interest
exemption. Royalties are not taxed because of treaty-
based reductions and treaty shopping.11 The only remain-
ing category is dividends, but even portfolio dividends are
generally not taxed because of the availability of equity
swaps (dividend equivalent payments on derivatives are
sourced to the residence of the recipient). Thus, the with-
holding tax is generally limited to direct dividends
received by corporate parents, a very unappealing source
of income since the underlying income is taxed at the sub-
sidiary level, at the parent level, and possibly also at the
level of the parent’s shareholders.
In an ideal world, this author would prefer to reimpose the
withholding tax on deductible payments, such as royalties
and interest, subject to treaty reductions, and to abandon
withholding on dividends and capital gains where the
underlying income was subject to tax.12 In particular, this
author would prefer abolishing the portfolio interest
exemption as part of a coordinated effort by the OECD to
reimpose a single layer of tax on interest flows, with
rebates of tax available upon a showing that the income
was declared in the country of residence. Such a coordi-
nated effort, however, seems unlikely under present condi-
tions, as the tide has turned against tax coordination
efforts. In the meantime, this author would propose aban-
doning the withholding tax altogether, with the whole
superstructure of complex regulations that go with it. It
achieves far too little buck for the bang.13
The principal argument in support of the withholding tax
is that it serves as an incentive for other countries to enter
treaty negotiations with the United States. Its importance,
however, is very doubtful under current conditions. The
United States already has tax treaties with most OECD
Member countries, which reduce the withholding tax rates
significantly; thus, achieving further reductions is unlikely
to be a major motivating factor in that case. The United
States has relatively few treaties with non-OECD coun-
tries and is actively interested in negotiating more such
treaties. Reducing U.S. withholding taxes, however, is
unlikely to be a major motive for these countries either,
because the United States is not a major target for
investors from developing countries (and they are uninter-
ested in encouraging outbound investment). Instead, they
are more interested in the encouragement of U.S. investors
that results from a tax treaty with the United States.
C. Adopt a default formula
Transfer pricing is a major source of transactional com-
plexity. Outbound transfer pricing can be dealt with by
abolishing deferral, but this seems unlikely at the moment
and would not address inbound transfer pricing. Thus, it
seems necessary to do something about transfer pricing
and, more generally, the division of active income among
source jurisdictions (that have the primary right to tax
active income under the benefits principle).
The most significant development in transfer pricing in
recent years is the rise of advance pricing agreements
(APAs). In particular, the availability of the formulary
methods to split the residual profit (which cannot be allo-
cated using comparables since no comparables exist) in
multilateral APAs, like the ones applicable to global trad-
ing, is a major step forward. APAs are complicated to
negotiate, however, especially with multiple taxing juris-
dictions, and there are many multinationals that refuse to
enter the process despite the recent string of victories by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the transfer pricing
area.14
Thus, it seems advisable to adopt a default formulary
apportionment rule to apply to taxpayers who refuse to
enter the APA program either because of its cost or
because litigation offers a better prospect of success. The
formula should be simple to understand and to apply, and
the three-factor state formula seems a good candidate.15
The major drawback of this formula is that it ignores
intangibles, but a good argument can be made that the
residual profit from intangibles results from the relation-
ship among the related entities and therefore cannot be
allocated among them in any but an arbitrary way.16 If tax-
payers feel the formula is biased against them in some
way, they will be free to enter negotiations for an APA.
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11. See SDI Netherlands v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 161 (1996) (royalties paid
to and by a “Dutch sandwich” company not subject to withholding).
12. This author would thus prefer abolishing I.R.C. § 897 (Foreign Investment
in Real Property Tax Act or FIRPTA) – a useless, xenophobic section that
achieves transactional complexity principally by requiring documentation of
non-foreign status in every securities transaction where real estate is a signifi-
cant source of value. It is not as if the underlying source of value added (i.e. the
real estate) is likely to leave U.S. taxing jurisdiction. 
13. At the very least, the United States should repeal I.R.C. § 884 (the branch
profits tax) as an unnecessary effort to impose two levels of tax on inbound cor-
porate investors. Of course, that would have the practical effect (in these days of
limited liability companies (LLCs)) of eliminating the dividend withholding tax
as well. I.R.C § 163(j) (the earning stripping rule), however, should be retained
because it is needed to preserve the single U.S. source-based tax on active
income.
14. See e.g. DHL Corp., 76 T.C.M. 1122 (1998), United Parcel Service, 78
T.C.M. 262 (1999), Compaq Computer, 113 T.C. No. 17 (1999), and The Lim-
ited, Inc., 113 T.C. No. 13 (1999), all transfer pricing cases won by the IRS.
United Parcel Service, however, was reversed on appeal, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
13926 (11th Cir. 2001).
15. It clearly formed the basis for the formula used in the global trading APAs.
16. For a more elaborate statement of this proposal, see Avi-Yonah, Reuven S.,
“The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Development of US Inter-
national Taxation”, 15 Virginia Tax Review 89 (1995).
The concern with the United States adopting a formula
would be an increased risk of double taxation if other
countries refuse to go along. It is not clear, however, that
they would – even the OECD transfer pricing guidelines
permit the use of formulas (“any other method”) if all par-
ties agree. The United States has pioneered many useful
international tax rules, such as the foreign tax credit and
controlled foreign corporation (CFC) legislation, and it
can be a pioneer in this field as well.
D. Simplify the anti-deferral rules
The most significant simplification measure possible in
the outbound area would be to abolish deferral altogether
by looking through all CFCs, as proposed by Peroni,
Fleming and Shay.17 This is particularly appealing since,
after check-the-box, deferral has become elective and end-
ing deferral would eliminate outbound transfer pricing as
well as many other sources of complexity.18
In the current political climate, however, abolishing defer-
ral seems highly unlikely. Thus, the most sensible pro-
posal is the one adopted by the Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion.19 Under this proposal, four out of the current six
anti-deferral regimes would be eliminated. The accumu-
lated earnings tax, the foreign personal holding company
(FPHC) regime and the foreign investment company
regime would be abolished, and the personal holding com-
pany regime would not apply to foreign corporations. The
only remaining regimes would be the passive foreign
investment company (PFIC) regime and Subpart F, which
apply to portfolio and controlling shareholders, respect-
ively (and do not overlap). Sensibly, the Joint Committee
did not attempt to invent a new regime that would be an
amalgam of the PFIC and FPHC regimes, as was
attempted by Dan Rostenkowski in the 1992 legislation.
It has been quite frustrating to operate under all six
regimes since 1992, when they were almost eliminated.
Hopefully, this time, the opportunity will not be missed,
and the Joint Committee’s recommendation will be
adopted as soon as possible. The only question is whether
some further simplification should be achieved within the
PFIC regime, which is burdensome for small taxpayers.
This author would prefer a de minimis rule for PFIC
income (e.g. USD 10,000 per taxpayer, indexed for infla-
tion) for cases in which the violation of horizontal equity
is not egregious enough to justify imposing the PFIC
regime.
E. Simplify Subpart F
The biggest missed opportunity in the Joint Committee
Study is its failure to address Subpart F, primarily because
of its political salience. As this author has written else-
where, Subpart F as currently drafted is obsolete because it
relies on an active/passive distinction that is unrelated to
the underlying question whether the income has been
taxed elsewhere and should therefore (under the benefits
principle) be exempt from further U.S. tax. Instead, the
United States should follow most other OECD countries
by applying Subpart F to cases where the income was not
subject to an effective tax rate overseas that is at least
90% of the U.S. corporate rate.20 This “low-tax kick-in” is
consistent with one of the recommendations of the recent
Treasury Study of Subpart F and is unlikely to put U.S.
multinationals at a competitive disadvantage given the
CFC rules of our trading partners.21
F. Abandon the baskets
The principal rationale for the current basket system for
the foreign tax credit (I.R.C. § 904(d)) is capital export
neutrality (CEN). Absent some limitation on cross-credit-
ing or averaging, taxpayers in an excess credit position
have an incentive to derive income from low-tax countries
rather than from the United States, thus violating CEN.
This can be illustrated by the following example, in which





U.S. tentative tax 35
foreign tax credit limitation 35 (35% x 100)
foreign tax credit (35)




The taxpayer now can choose between investing to earn an
additional 100 in the United States or in Foreign Country
B, which has no income tax. If the taxpayer invests in the
United States, the result is:
Foreign Country A United States
taxable income 100 100
foreign tax 50 0
U.S. tentative tax 35 35
foreign tax credit limitation 35 (35% x 100) 0
foreign tax credit (35) 0
net U.S. tax 0 35
total tax 50 35
after-tax income 50 65
excess credit 15
If the taxpayer invests in Foreign Country B, the result is:
Foreign Country A Foreign 
Country B
taxable income 100 100
foreign tax 50 0
U.S. tentative tax 35 35
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17. See Peroni, Robert, J. Clifton Fleming and Steve Shay, “Getting Serious
about Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income”, 52 Southern
Methodist Univ. Law Review 455 (1999).
18. For a listing, see Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “To End Deferral as We Know It:
Simplification Potential of Check the Box”, 74 Tax Notes 219 (1997).
19. Joint Committee Study, supra note 1, at 834.
20. See Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “U.S. Notice 98-11 and the Logic of Subpart F:
A Comparative Perspective”, 98 Tax Notes International 1797 (8 June 1998).
21. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, “The Deferral of Income Earned
Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations: A Policy Study”, 2001 WTD 1-
45 (2001).
foreign tax credit limitation 70 (35% x 200) 70
foreign tax credit (50) 0
net U.S. tax (15) 35
total tax 35 35
after-tax income 65 65
excess credit 0
Thus, in this case, the taxpayer has an incentive to invest
in Foreign Country B and not in the United States, which
violates CEN.
Consider, however, a taxpayer in excess limitation




U.S. tentative tax 35
foreign tax credit limitation 35 (35% x 100)
foreign tax credit 0




The taxpayer now can choose between investing to earn an
additional 100 in the United States or in Foreign Country
A, which has an income tax of 50%. If the taxpayer invests
in the United States, the result is:
Foreign Country B United States
taxable income 100 100
foreign tax 0 0
U.S. tentative tax 35 35
foreign tax credit limitation 35 (35% x 100) 0
foreign tax credit 0 0
net U.S. tax 35 35
total tax 35 35
after-tax income 65 65
excess limitation 35
If the taxpayer invests in Foreign Country A, the result is:
Foreign Country B Foreign
Country A
taxable income 100 100
foreign tax 0 50
U.S. tentative tax 35 35
foreign tax credit limitation 70 (35% x 200) 70
foreign tax credit 0 (50)
net U.S. tax 35 (15)
total tax 35 35
after-tax income 65 65
excess limitation 20
Thus, CEN is not violated in this case: the taxpayer is
indifferent between investing in the United States or in
Foreign Country A. The only difference is the tax revenues
of the U.S. Treasury, which in the case of the U.S. invest-
ment are 70, but in the case of the Foreign Country A
investment are only 20.
The general conclusion therefore is that the basket system
is needed to protect CEN only for taxpayers in excess
credit, but not for taxpayers at the limit or in excess limi-
tation positions. Since most U.S. multinationals are cur-
rently in a neutral or excess limitation position, it is ques-
tionable whether the baskets are needed to protect CEN.
More generally, one has to remember that the imposition
of the foreign tax credit limitation in the first place violates
CEN. It is a necessary concession to reality, however,
because an unlimited credit offers too much incentive to
other countries to raise tax rates at the expense of the U.S.
Treasury. Having made that concession, however, it does
not appear sensible to add a highly complicated basket
system just because, for some taxpayers, there will be an
incentive to invest elsewhere depending on the precise
order of their investments. In the end, the worst thing that
can happen from allowing cross-crediting will be that tax-
payers can always credit all of their foreign taxes, which
they seem to be able to do today as well with much trans-
actional complexity and planning.22 Full crediting of for-
eign taxes imposed primarily on active income is consis-
tent with CEN and with the single tax and benefit
principles. Therefore, this author proposes abolishing the
baskets and permitting taxpayers to cross-credit freely.
This would eliminate a major source of transactional com-
plexity.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing six proposals, if adopted, would represent a
major step forward in rationalizing and simplifying the
U.S. international tax regime. The proposals need not be
adopted as a package: any single proposal can stand on its
own, although, as a political matter, it may be advisable to
bundle them together (e.g. reforming Subpart F as a trade-
off for abolishing the baskets).
These six proposals do not, of course, represent the only
ways in which the U.S. international tax regime can be
simplified. Each proposal, however, offers the potential
for a significant reduction of transactional complexity,
which, in terms of wasted effort and needless costs, is
much more important than simplifying the statutory lan-
guage or length of the I.R.C. This distinction can be illus-
trated by a recent proposal not supported by this author: to
move the United States to a territorial (exemption) regime.
Such a regime could certainly simplify the I.R.C. because
all the anti-deferral rules and the foreign tax credit rules
could be eliminated in one fell swoop. There would, how-
ever, be a significant added level of transactional com-
plexity because of the increased need to monitor the
source of income (since only U.S.-source income would
be taxable for all taxpayers) and transfer pricing. Thus, it
seems that this proposal does not offer a real chance for
simplification. Simplification is worthwhile only if it can
reduce the staggering amount of resources currently
devoted to enforcing and complying with the U.S. interna-
tional tax rules. Hopefully, this article makes useful sug-
gestions in that direction.
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22. The IRS and the courts, however, should continue to be vigilant in regard
to crediting foreign taxes where the burden clearly does not fall on the taxpayer,
as in the Compaq case (Compaq Computer, 113 T.C. 214 (1999)) and the exam-
ples described in Notice 98-5, 1998-3 I.R.B. 49. These precedents seem a suffi-
cient deterrent to prevent abuse of a basketless regime.
